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Abstract
Generative models are widely used for publishing synthetic
datasets. Despite practical successes, recent works have shown
some generative models may leak privacy of the data that have
been used during training. Membership inference attacks aim
to determine whether a sample has been used in the training set
given query access to the model API. Despite recent work in
this area, many of the attacks designed against generative mod-
els require very specific attributes from the learned models
(e.g. discriminator scores, generated images, etc.). Further-
more, many of these attacks are heuristic and do not provide
effective bounds for privacy loss.
In this work, we formally study the membership privacy leak-
age risk of generative models. Specifically, we formulate mem-
bership privacy as a statistical divergence between training
samples and hold-out samples, and propose sample-based
methods to estimate this divergence. Unlike previous works,
our proposed metric and estimators make realistic and flexible
assumptions. First, we use a generalizable metric as an alterna-
tive to accuracy, since practical model training often leads to
imbalanced train/hold-out splits(Jayaraman et al. 2020; Rezaei
and Liu 2020). Second, our estimators are capable of estimat-
ing statistical divergence using any scalar or vector valued
attributes from the learned model instead of very specific at-
tributes.
Furthermore, we show a connection to differential privacy.
This allows our proposed estimators to provide a data-driven
certificate to understand the privacy budget needed for differ-
entially private generative models. We demonstrate the utility
of our framework through experimental demonstrations on
different generative models using various model attributes
yielding some new insights about membership leakage and
vulnerabilities of models.
Introduction
How can we release sensitive datasets while protecting
the privacy of individuals in such datasets? Recent progress
in generative machine learning has provided a new path to
sharing of such data (Han et al. 2018; Yi, Walia, and Babyn
2019). However, recent work has demonstrated that even
such approaches are vulnerable to privacy leakage since
they are shown to overfit to their training datasets (Liu, Li,
and Gao 2018). Adversaries can exploit this vulnerability
with query access to the trained models or the synthetic
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data outputs, to infer membership of samples to the train-
ing datasets (Hilprecht, Ha¨rterich, and Bernau 2019; Hayes
et al. 2019; Mukherjee et al. 2019; Chen et al. 2019).
To overcome this, researchers have developed many gener-
ative machine learning approaches that are protected against
privacy attacks. These approaches generally fall under two
broad classes: i) differentially private approaches, ii) empiri-
cal approaches. Differentially Private (DP) approaches such
as DPGAN (Xie et al. 2018), DP-cGAN (Torkzadehmahani,
Kairouz, and Paten 2019), PATE-GAN (Jordon, Yoon, and
van der Schaar 2018) rely on adding noise during the training
process (either to gradients or to labels). While these ap-
proaches come with formal guarantees of privacy, they have
been shown to lead to poor sample qualities for reasonable
privacy bounds (Hayes et al. 2019). Empirical approaches
such as privGAN (Mukherjee et al. 2019) show higher sample
quality but provide no privacy guarantees. Such approaches
typically demonstrate the privacy benefits by empirical eval-
uation against previously proposed. While empirical evalu-
ations seen in (Hayes et al. 2019; Hilprecht, Ha¨rterich, and
Bernau 2019) provide some data driven way to quantify pri-
vacy loss, they often are non-principled and do not take into
account the imbalanced nature of the membership inference
problem (Jayaraman and Evans 2019) (there are usually many
more non-members than members).
On the other hand, differential privacy is capable of pro-
viding strong query-specific theoretical guarantees. Currently
all DP based generative modeling approaches (to the best of
our knowledge) treat the model parameters themselves as the
query, thereby providing the strongest possible guarantees.
However, since releasing entire model parameters are not
necessarily the only or even the most common query against
generative models, there is a distinct need to quantify the
membership loss for other types of queries (e.g. release of
partial model or release of only synthetic data). Furthermore,
DP approaches require knowledge of the model training pro-
cess to provide guarantees, which does not allow providing
guarantees retrospectively to pre-trained models. In the case
of discriminative models, this has motivated the formal study
of alternate approaches to quantify membership privacy loss
without needing to rely on purely empirical evaluation (Ja-
yaraman and Evans 2019; Jayaraman et al. 2020). Not only
do these approaches provide an alternate ways to quantify
membership privacy loss for differentially private approaches,
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Figure 1: Overview of the MACE framework.
allowing these models to be trained for more epochs or with
lower noise addition, they also extend to non-differentially
private approaches as well.
In this paper, we build on these prior works to develop a
flexible framework to measure membership privacy loss in
generative models (MACE: Membership privACy Estima-
tion). Our framework is built on a rigorous formulation of
membership privacy loss (given a model and a query func-
tion) as a statistical divergence between the distribution of
training set and non-training set samples. Our primary con-
tributions are the following: i) We show connection of our
membership privacy loss to differential privacy, ii) we de-
velop principled sample-based estimators to measure mem-
bership privacy leakage for pre-trained models against any
scalar/vector-valued query, iii) to deal with the imbalanced
nature of membership privacy attacks, we allow users to se-
lect their preferred privacy loss metric from a generalized
family of metrics (Koyejo et al. 2014) and create custom
statistical divergences. An overview of our framework can
be seen in Figure 1. Finally, we test our framework using
a variety of queries against different classes of generative
models.
Preliminaries
Notation
Let z = (x, y) ∈ X×Y be a data point from data distribution
D. Let S ∼ Dn be an ordered list of n points which we will
refer as training set, sampled from D. We will use z ∼ S
to denote uniformly sampling from a finite training set S.
Also, we will use z ∼ D\S to denote uniformly sampling
from the data distribution not including the training set S,
which is referred as sampling from a hold-out set. For a
set of samples {z1, z2, · · · , zN}, we define associated labels
{m1,m2, · · · ,mN}, where mi = 1 if zi is in the training
set and mi = −1 otherwise for i = 1, · · · , N . In the rest of
the paper, we will assume that the training set S is fixed.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
Generative Adversarial Networks are the most common class
of generative models. The original GAN algorithm (Good-
fellow et al. 2014) was designed to learn a distribution of a
dataset by adversarially training two modules, namely, a gen-
erator and a discriminator. The goal of the generator G(w)
was to learn a transformation that would convert a random
vector w to a realistic data sample. The goal of the discrimi-
nator module D is to reliably distinguish synthetic samples
(generated by the generator) from real samples. The mathe-
matical formulation of this problem is as follows:
min
G
max
D
Ex∼pr(x)[logD(x)] + Ex∼pG(x)[log(1−D(x)] . (1)
Here, Pr is the real data distribution, and PG is the distribu-
tion of G(w). In this work, we examine our framework on
the original GAN and some of its variations.
Membership Inference Attack
The goal of a membership inference attack (MIA) (Li et al.
2013; Shokri et al. 2017; Truex et al. 2018; Long, Bind-
schaedler, and Gunter 2017), is to infer whether a sample
is used in the training data or not. As described previously
in (Mukherjee et al. 2019), for a given learning algorithm A,
the goal of a MIA adversary is to learn the function g(z,A),
where:
Pr(z ∈ S) = g(z,A)
In this paper, we focus on the specific case where A is a gen-
erative machine learning algorithm (such as GANs). Study of
MIAs against generative models is a relatively new research
area. (Hayes et al. 2019) first demonstrated MIAs against
GANs. They propose: i) a black-box adversary which trains
a shadow GAN model using the released synthetic data, ii)
a white-box adversary that uses a threshold on the discrimi-
nator score of a released GAN model. (Hilprecht, Ha¨rterich,
and Bernau 2019) demonstrates a black-box MIA adversary
which uses only the generator of the GANs (or synthetic
samples) and operates by thresholding the L2 distance be-
tween the query sample and the closest synthetic sample.
In summary, these existing works focus on choosing a par-
ticular query function to the pre-trained model and form a
strong binary classifier as the adversary. However, despite
the empirical success of such approaches, there are several
open problems: i) most papers use accuracy as the metric to
evaluate MIA adversaries. In practice, hold-out set could be
much larger than the training set and accuracy is known to be
a rather poor metric for imbalanced classification problems.
ii) threshold based adversary choice is based on heuristics
and might be hard to transfer to different datasets and mod-
els. Our framework addresses these issues by deriving the
theoretically strongest possible adversary for a generalized
metric. Unlike other approaches, we also provide confidence
intervals for individual-level privacy loss.
Membership Privacy
In this section, we formulate our membership privacy esti-
mation framework.
Membership Privacy Framework
To evaluate membership privacy leakage of a pre-trained
model or a query of the model, we define Experiment 1
inspired by (Yeom et al. 2018; Jayaraman et al. 2020). The
experiment assumes we have sampled a training set S with
size |S| = n from the data distribution D. Then a learning
algorithmA is trained on S but we only have access to the pre-
trained model through a query function QS : X → Q which
takes a sample from D as a input. In practical scenarios, data
providers could either release partial/full model parameters
(including architecture), or only the output of the model.
In the case of generative models, the output of the model
would correspond to synthetic datasets. Some specific choices
of queries QS will be discussed later. In this section, we
do not distinguish between types of query function QS for
simplicity.
Experiment 1 ( (Yeom et al. 2018; Jayaraman et al. 2020)
). Let A be a learning algorithm, D be the data distribution
on Z . We first have a training set S ∼ Dn with size |S| = n
and have a trained model by algorithm A. Let QS : X → Q
be a query function of the pre-trained model. Let A : Q →
{−1, 1} be an adversary, a binary classifier of membership
inference. The membership experiment proceeds as follows:
1. Randomly sample m ∈ {−1, 1} such that m = 1 with
probability p.
2. If m = 1, then uniformly sample z ∼ S; otherwise sample
z ∼ D\S uniformly.
3. Output utility score u = 1 if A(QS(z)) = m; otherwise
outputs u = −1.
Based on the utility scores, (Yeom et al. 2018) defines the
metric Adv for measuring privacy leakage through QS .
Definition 1 ((Yeom et al. 2018)). The membership advan-
tage of QS by adversary A is defined as
Advp(QS ,A) = 2P (A(QS(z)) = m)− 1 = E[u], (2)
where the probability is taken over the random sample
z ∼ S or z ∼ D\S, while the training set S is fixed.
Note, if algorithm A is random guessing, we would have
Advp(QS ,A) = 0. If A(QS(z)) = m always holds, then
we have Advp(QS ,A) = 1.
The prior probability p of sampling from the training set
is usually set as 0.5 to form a balanced binary classification
problem. This assumption has been widely accepted, e.g.
(Yeom et al. 2018). However, in practice, p is usually much
smaller than 0.5, as (Jayaraman et al. 2020; Rezaei and Liu
2020) pointed out. To mitigate the imbalanced dataset prob-
lem, we introduce a generalized metric based estimator for
practical purposes. The details are explained in a following
section.
Bayes Optimal Classifier
As previously mentioned, a drawback of several existing
MIA approaches is their use of heuristic classifiers as adver-
saries.The inherent drawback of such approaches is that the
attack performance then becomes a function of how good a
classifier is selected. To overcome this, we seek to use the
strongest possible classier for a given classification task i.e.
the Bayes optimal classifier(Sablayrolles et al. 2019; Mukher-
jee et al. 2019). This leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Bayes optimal adversary(Sablayrolles et al. 2019)
). Given the query QS , the data distribution D, the training
set S and the prior probability p, the Bayes optimal classifier
A∗ maximizing membership advantage is given by
A∗(QS(z)) = sgn
(
P (m = 1|QS(z))− 1
2
)
. (3)
Thus, we have
max
A
Advp(QS ,A) = Ez [|fp(z)|] , (4)
where
fp(z) :=
P(QS(z)|m = 1)p− P(QS(z)|m = −1)(1− p)
P(QS(z)|m = 1)p+ P(QS(z)|m = −1)(1− p) . (5)
Note: Proofs of lemmas and theorems can be found in the
Appendix. We will henceforth refer to |fp(z)| as individual-
level privacy loss for a sample z. We have the following
definition and lemma for membership privacy.
Definition 3 ((α, p)-membership privacy). We say a query
function QS satisfies strong (α, p)-membership privacy if
and only if for any choice of z, the privacy loss satisfies
|fp(z)| ≤ α . (6)
Lemma 4. If a query function QS is (α, p)-membership
private then the membership advantage satisfies
Advp(QS ,A) ≤ α for any adversary A.
For simplicity, we refer to Advp(QS) as the optimal mem-
bership advantage maxAAdvp(QS) in the rest of the paper.
Connection to Differential Privacy
The (α, p) membership privacy is connected to ε-differential
privacy through the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If the training algorithm is ε-differentially pri-
vate, then for any choice of z and p, we have
|fp(z)| ≤ max
{∣∣∣∣tanh(ε+ λ2
)∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣tanh(−ε+ λ2
)∣∣∣∣} , (7)
where λ := log
(
p
1−p
)
.
Specifically, when the prior probability p = 0.5, we have
Advp(QS) ≤ tanh(ε/2). As an example, if we set privacy
budget ε = 1, we have Advp(QS) ≤ 0.462. This provides
us with an intuitive way to understand the privacy budget
selection in DP methods.
Membership Privacy Testing
In this section, we aim to provide a practical and princi-
pled approach to estimate |fp(z)| and Advp(QS) through
Experiment 1.
Membership Privacy Testing
First, We construct an estimator for f(z), denoted as f̂(z).
Then we estimate the optimal membership advantage by
Âdvp =
1
N
∑N
i=1 |f̂(zi)|. For simplicity, denote P :=
P(QS(z)|m = 1) and Q := P(QS(z)|m = −1). Notice
that the support is the domain of the queries Q. Now the
problem reduces to estimation of the statistical difference
between P and Q defined by Eq (5). In the following sub-
sections, we provide practical estimators for both discrete
and continuous query functions QS .
Discrete Query When QS(z) ∈ Q is discrete, for a par-
ticular output j ∈ Q, let pj = P(QS(z) = j|m = 1) and
qj = P(QS(z) = j|m = −1). Frequency-based plug-in
methods have been widely used empirically (Mukherjee et al.
2019; Yaghini, Kulynych, and Troncoso 2019) to estimate
fp(z). Prior works simply collect samples from Experiment 1
and plug-in the fraction to estimate pj and qj . We account
for the estimation error of this process by using a Clopper-
Pearson confidence interval (Clopper and Pearson 1934). We
find a δ2 -Clopper Pearson lower bound for pj denoted as
pˆj,lower and δ2 -Clopper Pearson upper bound for pj denoted
as pˆj,upper. Then we have following confidence interval.
Lemma 5. If QS(z) = j, then the δ-confidence interval
C1−δ(z) of fp(z) is[
pˆj,lowerp− qˆj,upper(1− p)
pˆj,lowerp+ qˆj,upper(1− p) ,
pˆj,upperp− qˆj,lower(1− p)
pˆj,upperp+ qˆj,lower(1− p)
]
.
Continuous Query If QS is a d-dimensional continuous
random variable. Let p(x) = P(QS(z) = x|m = 1) and
q(x) = P(QS(z) = x|m = −1). We first use Kernel Density
Estimators (KDE) for both p(x) and q(x).
Recall that for samples x1, x2, · · · , xN ∈ Rd from an
unknown distributionP and density p, a KDE with bandwidth
h and kernel function K is given by
p̂N (x) =
1
Nhd
N∑
i=1
K
(
x− xi
h
)
. (8)
And we have following plug-in confidence interval for
KDE.
Lemma 6 ((Chen 2017)). With probability 1− δ/2, we have
p(x) ∈ [p̂lower(x), p̂upper(x)] , (9)
where
p̂lower(x) = p̂N (x)− z1−δ/4
√
µK · p̂N (x)
Nhd
,
p̂upper(x) = p̂N (x) + z1−δ/4
√
µK · p̂N (x)
Nhd
.
and µK :=
∫
K2(x)dx, z1−δ/4 is the 1− δ/2 quantile of a
standard normal distribution.
Using this, we have the following confidence interval for
fp(z).
Lemma 7. The δ-confidence interval C1−δ(z) of fp(z) is[
p̂lower(QS(z))p− q̂upper(QS(z))(1− p)
p̂lower(QS(z))p+ q̂upper(QS(z))(1− p) ,
p̂upper(QS(z))p− q̂lower(QS(z))(1− p)
p̂upper(QS(z))p+ q̂lower(QS(z))(1− p)
]
.
Estimation of Advp(QS) For a particular sample z, now
we can estimate the confidence interval fp(z) through Ex-
periment 1. To estimate the optimal membership advantage
Advp(QS), we first split the samples into two partitions. We
use the first partition to estimate empirical distributions for
discrete queries or KDE for continuous queries. Then we use
the second partition to estimate Advp(QS). The procedure
is outlined as Algorithm 1.
Membership Privacy Estimation by Generalized
Metric
As pointed out in (Jayaraman et al. 2020; Rezaei and Liu
2020), in reality, membership privacy leakage is a highly im-
balanced problem. For example, the training set in a medical
dataset may consist of data from the patients admitted to a
clinical study with a particular health condition and the distri-
bution D may represent data from all patients (in the world)
with the same health condition. Notably, in previous works
(Hayes et al. 2019; Hilprecht, Ha¨rterich, and Bernau 2019;
Mukherjee et al. 2019) where accuracy/precision/recall are
being used as a metric to measure the privacy risks, datasets
Algorithm 1 Estimate optimal membership advantage
Âdvp(QS) through Experiment 1
Input: number of samples N , prior of membership p, train-
ing set S, query function QS , confidence level δ
Output: estimate optimal membership advantage
Âdvp(QS)
1: Perform Experiment 1 and draw two sets of samples
{z(1)i }Ni=1 and {z(2)i }Ni=1 with membership {m(1)i }Ni=1
and {m(2)i }Ni=1 respectively.
2: for i=1to N do
3: Estimate f̂p(z
(2)
i ) by samples from {z(1)i }Ni=1.
4: end for
5: Âdvp(QS)← 1N
∑
i∈[N ] f̂p(z
(2)
i )
are randomly split into training set and hold-out set with im-
balanced prior (p < 0.5). For example, (Hayes et al. 2019)
uses only 10% of the datasets for training and the rest serves
as hold-out. As pointed out in (Rezaei and Liu 2020), one
can simply construct a trivial attack by checking whether a
sample is correctly classified for discriminative models. Such
a simple attack would result in high accuracy/precision/recall
during privacy evaluation stage but would be useless in prac-
tice.
To overcome these issues, (Jayaraman and Evans 2019;
Jayaraman et al. 2020) suggest to use positive predictive
value (PPV), which is defined as ratio of true members pre-
dicted among all positive membership predictions made by
an adversary A. Here, we allow users even more flexibility
by adopting a generalized metric, first defined in (Koyejo
et al. 2014), which can be seen as a linear combination of fol-
lowing population quantities for binary classifications: true
positives (TP), false positives (FP), false negatives (FN) and
true negatives (TN).
The generalized metric is defined as
`(A,m) = a0 + a11TP + a10FP + a01FN + a00TN
b0 + b11TP + b10FP + b01FN + b00TN
, (10)
where a0, b0, aij and bij are pre-defined scalars for i = 0, 1
and j = 0, 1. For example, we can represent commonly used
metric as following:
ACC =
TP + TN
TP + FP + TN + FN
(11)
PPV or Precision =
TP
TP + FP
. (12)
Thus, through Experiment 1, we define the following met-
ric to measure the membership privacy.
Definition 8. The expected membership advantage of A for
QS under generalized metric ` is defined as
Adv`,p(QS ,A) = Ez[`(A,m)] . (13)
Now we seek to estimate the optimal adversary for this
generalized metric. The characterization of Bayes classifier
in Lemma 2 is not applicable anymore. In fact, (Koyejo
et al. 2014) has shown that the Bayes optimal classifier
takes the form A∗(QS(z)) = sgn(η(QS(z)) − t`), where
η(QS(z)) := P(m = 1|QS(z)) and t` ∈ (0, 1) is a constant
depending on metric `.
In this case, based on (Koyejo et al. 2014), we de-
rive the following consistent two-step plug-in estimator for
optimal membership advantage under generalized metric
Adv`,p(QS). Similarly as Algorithm 1, we first split the sam-
ples into three partitions, we use the first partition to obtain
estimator η̂(QS(z)) for η(QS(z)). Then we use the second
partition to find optimal t`. Finally, we apply our consistent
classifier to estimate the membership privacy Adv`,p(QS)
under generalized metric `. The procedure is outlined in Al-
gorithm 2. Similarly as before, if QS(z) is discrete, we use
plug-in estimator directly, if QS(z) is continuous, we apply
KDE estimator at the step 2.
Algorithm 2 Estimate membership privacy
maxAAdvp,`(QS ,A) under generalized metric `
through Experiment 1
Input: number of samples N , prior of membership p, train-
ing set S, query function QS , generalized metric `
Output: estimate membership privacy Adv`,p(QS)
1: Perform Experiment 1 and draw two sets of samples
{z(1)i }Ni=1, {z(2)i }Ni=1 and {z(3)i }Ni=1 with membership
{m(1)i }Ni=1, {m(2)i }Ni=1 and {m(3)i }Ni=1 respectively.
2: Estimate η(QS(z)) by samples from {z(1)i }Ni=1.
3: t` ← argmaxx∈(0,1) 1N
∑N
i=1 `(sgn(η̂(QS(z
(2)
i )) −
x),m
(2)
i )
4: Let A∗(QS(z)) = sgn(η̂(QS(z))− t`).
5: Evaluate Âdv`,p(QS)← 1N
∑N
i=1 `(A∗, y(3)i ).
Attack on Generative Models
In this section, we seek to understand what kind of in-
formation could be released to public with limited privacy
leakage. In DP based generative models, the weights of both
discriminator and generator are differentially private. It is
safe to release the whole pre-trained model including weights
and architecture since the membership privacy is bounded by
Theorem 1. However, such strong privacy guarantees require
a large amount of noise added to the gradient, which results
in low sample qualities. In this section, we aim to construct
several example query functions QS(z) so we can compare
membership privacy leakage under different data releasing
scenarios.
Following (Chen et al. 2019; Hilprecht, Ha¨rterich, and
Bernau 2019; Hayes et al. 2019), we divide our attack settings
based on accessibility of model components: (1) access to
models; (2) access only to generated images. In the following
sub-sections we consider some representative examples of
query functions for each of these two attack settings.
Accessible Models
In this case, the adversary has access to the models. Typically,
white-box attacks assume that the adversary has access to par-
tial/full model parameters, while black-box attacks assumes
that adversary can only call output from a model API released
to the public. Existing work (Sablayrolles et al. 2019) has
theoretically shown that releasing model parameters would
not make the attack more successful, if we assume the model
is properly trained. For generative models, especially GANs,
the most successful attack known uses the output of the dis-
criminators (Hayes et al. 2019). Intuitively, if a sample is
shown in the training set, the discriminator would be more
likely to output high values. Notice that prior works do not
use the Bayes optimal adversary and instead use a heuris-
tic adversary based on thresholding of discriminator scores,
where the threshold is selected manually.
Accessible Synthetic Datasets
In the common practice of synthetic data releasing, re-
searchers or data providers may consider releasing only gen-
erated datasets or just the generator. However, prior works
(Chen et al. 2019; Hilprecht, Ha¨rterich, and Bernau 2019)
have shown releasing generator/synthetic datasets could also
cause privacy leakage. Specifically, under the case where gen-
erators are released, (Chen et al. 2019) considers the follow-
ing query function QS(z) = minw L2(z,G(w)), where G
is the generator released to the public. (Hilprecht, Ha¨rterich,
and Bernau 2019) first generates a large synthetic dataset
g1, g2, · · · , gn using the generator and then uses following
query function:
QS(z) = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
1gi∈Uε(z) log d (gi, z) , (14)
where d is some distance metric and Uε is ε-ball defined on
distance metric d. In both cases, it is reported that attack-
ing generators or synthetic datasets are not as successful as
attacking discriminator scores.
Similar to these approaches, here we consider a simple
query function (defined below). For a sample drawn from Ex-
periment 1, we consider using the nearest neighbor distance
to synthetic datasets as the query function:
QS(z) = min
j∈[n]
d(z, gj) , (15)
where d is a distance metric. In the experiment section, we
show comparable performance as (Hilprecht, Ha¨rterich, and
Bernau 2019).
Note: Aside from these two common classes of attacks
there may be hybrid attacks possible that are a combination of
these two classes of attacks. Since the design of such attacks
is beyond the scope of this paper, we leave this for future
work. Furthermore, in the main paper we restrict to demon-
strating our framework on some common classes of attacks on
scalar valued queries. However, attacks against vector valued
queries may be useful in special circumstances (like attacking
models with multiple generators/discriminators (Mukherjee
et al. 2019)). Some examples of such attacks are reported in
the Appendix.
Experiments
In this section, we perform practical membership privacy
estimation on pre-trained generative models.
Setup
We first demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods on
MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets using WGAN-GP(Gulrajani
et al. 2017) (and GAN (Goodfellow et al. 2014) in appendix).
MNIST contains gray scale images of handwritten digits
with 70000 digits from 0 to 9. CIFAR-10 comprises of 10
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Figure 2: Training progress vs. membership advantage of WGAN-GP by discriminator scores and average 0.05-confidence level:
(a) 100 bins of discriminator scores on MNIST trained on 7000 samples; (b) Gaussian KDE with a bandwidth equal to 1 on
MNIST trained on 7000 samples; (c) 100 bins of discriminator scores on CIFAR-10 trained on 6000 samples; (d) Gaussian KDE
with a bandwidth equal to 1 on CIFAR-10 trained on 6000 samples ;(e)100 bins of discriminator scores on CIFAR-10 trained on
50000 samples; (d) Gaussian KDE with a bandwidth equal to 1 on CIFAR-10 trained on 50000 samples
classes of 32 x32 RGB colored images with 60000 images
in the whole dataset. Both of them are commonly used in
GAN literature. Following common practice of membership
inference attack on generative models, (Hayes et al. 2019;
Mukherjee et al. 2019; Chen et al. 2019), we choose a ran-
dom 10% subset of the entire dataset as a training set to show
overfitting. For simplicity, we perform Experiment 1 with-
out replacement and use the whole dataset to estimate and
compute.
Estimation with confidence interval
We begin our privacy estimation by discriminator scores,
which is also the most popular attack for discriminative mod-
els. To compare the discrete query and continuous query, we
use the same settings as prior works (Yaghini, Kulynych,
and Troncoso 2019; Mukherjee et al. 2019) where we bin
the discriminator scores into 100 equally spaced bins. Then
we apply Algorithm 1 on discrete confidence score from
the discriminator. Noticed that such discretization mimics a
common real-world scenario where we do not observe the
exact confidence output (e.g. COMPAS system outputs a
score from 1 to 10 instead of the full condence score.) As a
comparison, we also apply KDE with Gaussian kernel and
bandwidth set at 1.0. Throughout the experiments, we set
p = 0.5, confidence level δ = 0.05. Figure 2 shows the
estimated optimal privacy advantage and average 0.05- confi-
dence interval through training progress. As we can see here,
the confidence interval of KDE totally falls in the confidence
interval of the discretized query. This shows our KDE based
Algorithm 1 is more accurate compared to the traditionally
mentioned binning strategy(Mukherjee et al. 2019). The es-
timated membership advantage starts from 0 and increases
with training. As expected, with more epochs, the model
starts to memorize the training set.
Figure 3 (a) shows the estimated membership advantage by
using generated synthetic datasets and nearest neighbor dis-
tance. The L2 distance is not perceptual meaningful for this
28x 28 image in pixel space. Instead, we calculate embedding
for each sample by using a pre-trained VGG net with per-
ceptual loss (Zhang et al. 2018). The estimated membership
advantage is much smaller than discriminator scores. This
indicates that the privacy risk of publishing generated syn-
thetic dataset is lower than publishing the white-box model
including discriminator and generator. Our results are also
comparable to (Hilprecht, Ha¨rterich, and Bernau 2019). Fig-
ure 3 (b) shows the estimated membership advantage on the
same model trained on MNIST for different sizes of the syn-
thetic dataset. It can be seen here that increasing the size of
the synthetic dataset increases the risk of privacy leakage.
Though it is still significantly more private than releasing the
models.
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Figure 3: (a) Training progress and membership advantage es-
timated by generated synthetic datasets with 104 samples (b)
The estimated membership advantage for different synthetic
dataset sizes
Estimation with Generalized Metrics
As mentioned previously, flexible privacy estimation frame-
work can be used for accessing generalized metrics. Here
as a sanity check, we compare PPV and Accuracy as met-
rics for membership privacy estimation, since both of them
have been commonly used in MIA literature (Jayaraman and
Evans 2019; Jayaraman et al. 2020). We set p = 0.1 here
to construct an imbalanced dataset. Figure 4 (a) shows PPV
and accuracy during training. The baseline accuracy for such
imbalanced dataset is 0.9, which can cause some misleading
reporting. However, PPV provides a better understanding
of how successful the adversary is in predicting training set
membership(Jayaraman and Evans 2019). Our generalized
metric allows users to explore a wide variety of other metrics
and potentially identify the best metrics catered to specific
situations.
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Figure 4: Training progress and PPV and Accuracy for
MNIST estimated by discriminator scores using Algorithm 2
Differential Privacy vs. Membership Privacy
As shown in Theorem 1, membership privacy loss is bounded
by differential privacy guarantees. Differential privacy con-
siders the worst case scenario, where for each individual
sample, the privacy loss |fp(z)| is bounded. Depending on
data distribution, it is possible that expected membership
advantage is small but some outliers in the data may be much
more vulnerable than others. In this section, we first examine
the privacy risk of subgroup samples in non-DP models and
then perform experiments on DP-cGAN(Torkzadehmahani,
Kairouz, and Paten 2019).
As pointed out by (Yaghini, Kulynych, and Troncoso
2019), membership leakage for some subgroup may be more
vulnerable than others for discriminative models. We con-
struct a toy dataset from MNIST by forming a new imbal-
anced dataset with 6900 digit zeros and 700 digit sixes. We
set p = 0.5 for simplicity. This dataset is also used for
anomaly detection(Bandaragoda et al. 2014). We perform
our privacy estimation by KDE for each subgroup. Figure 5
(a) shows the membership advantage for digit zeros is consis-
tently lower than digit sixes. This means even if average-case
membership advantage is small; sometimes, for specific sub-
groups, the privacy risk might be larger.
Figure 5 shows membership advantage trained DP-
cGAN(Torkzadehmahani, Kairouz, and Paten 2019) with
different privacy budget ε. We set p = 0.5. As we can see
here, the theoretic upper bound given by tanh(ε/2) is much
larger than the estimated membership advantage from dis-
criminator score.
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Figure 5: (a) Estimated privacy advantage by Algorithm 1 on
digit zeros and digit sixes;(b) Training progress and member-
ship advantage estimated for DP-cGAN
Figure 6 shows per-instance privacy loss |fp(z)| for both
ε = 2 and ε = 10. As expected, even the worst case ob-
served privacy loss |fp(z)| is strictly bounded by worst-case
bound that is estimated from  (tanh( 22 ) = 0.762 for  = 2,
tanh( 102 ) = 0.999 for  = 10).
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Figure 6: Per-instance privacy loss for DP-cGAN with pri-
vacy budget (ε, 10−5) (a) Per instance loss for ε = 2 (b)Per
instance loss for ε = 10
Conclusions
Understanding membership privacy is critical for data
providers to release synthetic datasets to the public. Here
we developed a formal framework that provides a certificate
for the privacy leakage given a query function to the pre-
trained model. We demonstrate the flexible capabilities of
our framework on multiple query and model types, as well
as metrics.
Our experiments indicate that releasing pre-trained GAN
models results in much higher membership privacy leakage
than would be the case if only synthetic datasets were re-
leased. However, we also show that larger the size of the
synthetic dataset released, more is the membership privacy
leakage. We also show that while DP-based methods have
strong privacy guarantees, realistic MIA attacks against DP
based methods are often much less effective, even at the
per-instance level.
While we focus on using commonly used queries QS in
this paper, there could be better designed queries that would
lead to stronger MIAs. Future work can be aimed at using
our MACE framework to identify better queries for general
as well as specific generative models.
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Ethics statement
Our current work is motivated by ethical concerns around
the use of generative models to enable privacy preserving
sharing of sensitive data. This has become a popular area
of research due to the new General Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR) policies, which enforce strict regulations on
sharing of personal data. Our current framework provides a
practical way to evaluate privacy loss in generative models in
response to specific MIAs. We hope that this will help both
algorithm developers as well as data sharers audit the privacy
loss of algorithms. It is important however to be mindful that
MACE provides query specific certificates, which should not
be conflated with how private a model is against any attack.
Furthermore, while comparing different algorithms, it is im-
portant to note that algorithms trained of different portions
of the data may not be directly comparable. Performing such
comparisons may lead to misleading conclusions.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. As we can see from Definition 1, the membership
advantage is defined as 2ACC(A)−1. This means the Bayes
classifier is given by sgn
(
P (m = 1|QS(z))− 12
)
. We get
optimal membership advantage by plug in this Bayes classi-
fier. (Sablayrolles et al. 2019) has similar analysis for accu-
racy.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. ε-differential privacy is defined as follows:
Definition 9 (pure Differential Privacy). We say a random-
ized algorithm M is ε-differentially private if for any pair of
neighbouring databases S and S′ that differ by one record
and any output event E, we have
P(M(S) ∈ E) ≤ eεP(M(S′) ∈ E) . (16)
By the post-processing property, the ε-differential privacy
indicates that the query output satisfies for any record z being
in the dataset or not, we have∣∣∣∣log P(QS(z))|m = 1QS(z)|m = −1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε (17)
Then Theorem 1 directly follows from that fact that
x− 1
x+ 1
= tanh(
1
2
ln(x)) . (18)
Proof of Lemma 6 and Lemma 7
Proof. This follow from the fact that x−1x+1 is a monotonically
increasing function for x > 0.
Model architectures and hyper–parameters
Here we outline the different layers used in the model
architectures for different datasets. The last layers of dis-
criminators for WGAN experiments do not have sigmoid
activation functions. The hyper-parameters are chosen the
same same as (Goodfellow et al. 2014; Gulrajani et al. 2017).
MNIST
Generator layers
• Dense(units= 512, input size= 100)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 512)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 1024)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 784, activation = ’tanh’)
Discriminator layers
• Dense(units= 2048)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 512)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 256)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 1, activation = ’sigmoid’)
CIFAR–10
Generator layers
• Conv2DTranspose(filters= 128, kernel size= 4, strides=
1)
• ReLU()
• Conv2DTranspose(filters= 64, kernel size= 4, strides= 2,
padding= 1)
• ReLU()
• Conv2DTranspose(filters= 32, kernel size= 4, strides= 2,
padding= 1)
• ReLU()
• Conv2DTranspose(filters= 3, kernel size= 4, strides=
2,padding= 1, activation = ’tanh’)
Discriminator layers
• Conv2D(filters= 64, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• Reshape(target shape= (2, 2, 512))
• Conv2D(filters= 128, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Conv2D(filters= 128, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Conv2D(filters= 256, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 1, activation = ’sigmoid’)
DP-cGAN implementation
We adapted code from (Torkzadehmahani, Kairouz, and
Paten 2019) and datasets (https://github.com/reihaneh-
torkzadehmahani/DP-CGAN). The choice of privacy budget
is set from 0.3 to 10 with a fixed σ = 5.1 and clipping value
1.1.
Multi-dimension Query
Our framework could be used for multi-dimensional query
function. As an example, we show attack on generated syn-
thetic datasets where the query function is the 3-nearest
neighbors. Figure 7 shows the WGAN-GP model trained
on MNIST datasets with 7000 samples in the training set.
Privacy Estimation for JS-GAN
Here we also attach membership privacy estimation results
for JS-GAN(Goodfellow et al. 2014) in Figure 8.
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Figure 7: Training progress and 3 nearest neighbor distance
in the generated synthetic datasets. The number of samples
in the synthetic datasets is set as 104. The bandwidth is set
as 0.1.
Multi-dimension Query for privGAN
To demonstrate the utility of attacks with multi-
dimensional queries against unique generative models, we
show a case study of privGAN(Mukherjee et al. 2019). priv-
GAN is a GAN architecture that consists of multiple gener-
ators and discriminators, and is designed to provide mem-
bership privacy. The training set is partitioned to train each
generator and discriminator separately. A privacy discrim-
inator is used as a regularizor to prevent overfitting. The
attack used in (Mukherjee et al. 2019) first computes dis-
criminator score for each of the discriminator, attack using
each discriminator score and then chooses the maximum one
as final estimated privacy loss. Here we directly use a 2d
query: QS(z) = (D1(z), D2(z)) to formulate an alternate
attack. Figure 9 shows a comparison of two strategies. We
choose the same hyper-parameters as (Mukherjee et al. 2019).
The privacy ratio λ is set as λ = 1. We use 2 discriminator
and generator pairs as an example. The red curve is based
on maximum of two 1d attack on discriminator scores for
each epoch. The blue curve is based on directly 2d query:
QS(z) = (D1(z), D2(z)). As we can see from Figure 9, the
membership advantage with 2d query performs much better
than the combination of two 1d query. Although privGAN
has lower overfitting than a JS-GAN (Figure 8), releasing
two discriminator could potentially increase the privacy risk.
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Figure 8: Training progress and membership advantage of JS-GAN(Goodfellow et al. 2014) by discriminator scores with 0.05
confidence level: (a) 100 bins of discriminator scores on MNIST trained on 7000 samples; (b) Gaussian KDE with a bandwidth
equal to 0.05 on MNIST trained on 7000 samples; (c) 100 bins of discriminator scores on CIFAR-10 trained on 6000 samples;
(d) Gaussian KDE with a bandwidth equal to 0.05 on CIFAR-10 trained on 6000 samples;
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Figure 9: Training progress and membership advantage of privGAN by two discriminator scores with a bandwidth 0.1.
